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Despite extensive criticisms of mass surveillance and mobilization by civil
liberties and digital rights activists, surveillance has paradoxically been
extended and legalized in the name of security. How do some demo-
cratic claims against surveillance appear to be normal and common-sense,
whereas others are deemed unacceptable, even outlandish? Instead of
starting from particular “logics” of either security or democracy, this pa-
per proposes to develop a political sociology of disputes to trace how the
relation between security and democracy is shaped by critique in practice.
Disputes entail critique and demands for justification. They allow us to ac-
count for the constraints which govern whether an argument is deemed ac-
ceptable or improper; common-sensical or peculiar. We mobilize disputes
in conjunction with Arjun Appadurai’s reflections on “small numbers” in
democracies in order to understand how justifications of surveillance for
security enact a “rise in generality,” whereas critiques of digital surveil-
lance that mobilize democratic claims enact a “descent into singularity.”
To this purpose, we analyze public mobilizations against mass surveillance
and challenges brought before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). We draw on interviews with a range of actors involved in the
disputes, the parties’ submissions, oral hearings, judgments, and public
reports.
Malgré les nombreuses critiques de la surveillance de masse et la mobili-
sation des militants des libertés civiles et des droits numériques, la surveil-
lance a paradoxalement été étendue et légalisée au nom de la sécurité.
Comment pouvons-nous expliquer que certaines revendications démocra-
tiques contre la surveillance semblent normales et de bon sens, alors que
d’autres sont jugées inacceptables, voire saugrenues ? Au lieu de partir
d’une « logique » particulière de sécurité ou de démocratie, cet article
propose de développer une sociologie politique des litiges afin de retracer
la manière dont la relation entre sécurité et démocratie est en pratique
façonnée par la critique. Les litiges englobent les critiques et les deman-
des de justification. Ils nous permettent de rendre compte des contraintes
qui déterminent si un argument est jugé acceptable ou inapproprié, de
bon sens ou étrange. Nous mobilisons ce concept de litiges conjointe-
ment aux réflexions d’Arjun Appadurai sur les « petits nombres » dans
les démocraties afin de comprendre la manière dont les justifications
de la surveillance à des fins de sécurité mettent en œuvre une « mon-
tée en généralité », tandis que les critiques de la surveillance numérique
qui mobilisent des revendications démocratiques mettent en œuvre une
« descente dans la singularité ». À cette fin, nous analysons les mobilisa-
tions publiques contre la surveillance de masse et les contestations portées
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2 Making Digital Surveillance Unacceptable?
devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme. Nous nous basons
sur des entretiens avec une série d’acteurs impliqués dans ces litiges, les
soumissions des parties, les audiences orales, les jugements et les rapports
publics.
A pesar de las amplias críticas a la vigilancia masiva y a la movilización por
parte de los activistas de derechos digitales y de libertades civiles, la vigi-
lancia se extendió y legalizó paradójicamente en nombre de la seguridad.
¿Cómo algunos reclamos democráticos contra la vigilancia parecen ser
normales y de sentido común, mientras que otros se consideran inacepta-
bles e incluso descabellados? En vez de partir de una “lógica” particular de
seguridad o democracia, este artículo propone desarrollar una sociología
política de disputas para rastrear cómo la relación entre la seguridad y la
democracia toma forma por la crítica en práctica. Las disputas implican
críticas y demandas de justificación. Nos permiten representar las limita-
ciones que rigen si un argumento se considera aceptable o impropio, de
sentido común o peculiar. Movilizamos las disputas junto con las reflex-
iones de Arjun Appadurai sobre los “números pequeños” en las democra-
cias para comprender cómo las justificaciones sobre la vigilancia por mo-
tivos de seguridad adoptan un “aumento de la generalidad,” mientras que
las críticas de la vigilancia digital que moviliza los reclamos democráticos
adoptan un “descenso a la singularidad.” En este sentido, analizamos las
movilizaciones públicas contra la vigilancia masiva, así como los retos pre-
sentados ante la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos. Nos basamos en
las entrevistas con una variedad de actores implicados en las disputas, los
alegatos de las partes, las audiencias orales, las sentencias y los informes
públicos.
We did not talk about how problematic it was to have mass surveillance per se. We
just continued to have the same arguments … hiding behind the idea that “we need
more safeguards” … I do not think we should give up criticizing mass surveillance.
But it’s just so hard to escape. (Interview, February 24, 2020)
Despite extensive criticism of mass surveillance and mobilization by civil liberties
and digital rights activists, surveillance has—paradoxically—been extended and le-
galized in the name of security. The Snowden disclosures in 2013 and the sub-
sequent introduction of the Investigatory Powers Act in the United Kingdom in
2016 were met with sustained mobilization by activists, academics, and NGOs. Both
through the coalition “Don’t Spy on Us!” and a series of cases lodged before the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) in the United Kingdom, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Community
(CJEU), different organizations, and individuals have raised public challenges to
the rationale, extent, and form of these practices of digital surveillance. As many
of our interlocutors within civil society suggested, however, so often within these
challenges, arguments were formulated around the more nuts-and-bolts aspects of
surveillance. “Escaping” from these constraints was extremely difficult.
How do some democratic claims, such as the establishment of safeguards, appear
to be normal and common-sense, whereas others are deemed unacceptable, even
outlandish? Instead of starting from particular “logics” of either security or democ-
racy, we propose to develop a political sociology of disputes to trace how the relation
between security and democracy is shaped by critique in practice. Disputes, as we
discuss later on, entail demands for justification, which are “inextricably linked with
the possibility of critique” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). They allow us to account
for the constraints which govern whether an argument is deemed acceptable or
improper, commonsensical or peculiar. In doing so, we propose to contribute to
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Critical security studies and IR more broadly have served as fertile ground for
thinking through this security–democracy relation. Jef Huysmans has recently pro-
posed to revisit the relation between security and democracy by approaching secu-
rity as “enacting democratic limits” (Huysmans 2014). Other critical scholars have
highlighted the limits of democracy, particularly in its instantiation as liberal democ-
racy, in being a resource for criticizing security. Democracy’s gendered (Phillips
1991), racialized (Hanchard 2018), and neoliberalized (Brown 2015) logics render
it inadequate or even inept in its resistance to security practices. Both security and
(liberal) democracy are practices of excluding abnormal or potentially dangerous
others, as they deploy mechanisms of discipline and surveillance to police bound-
aries between self and other. At the same time, democracy is also connected with
spaces of dissent and the possibilities of contesting security (Jabri 2006), and with
conceptions of justice and equality (Davis and Mendieta 2005).
Recent public debates about digital surveillance have mobilized arguments about
security and democracy to either justify or criticize surveillance by intelligence agen-
cies, particularly in the wake of the Snowden disclosures. As we see below, in one
challenge to UK state surveillance powers lodged before the ECtHR, civil society
groups argued that a state that enjoys all of these powers cannot be called demo-
cratic and is instead “truly totalitarian” (Jaffey in ECtHR 2019). Related public ad-
vocacy campaigns likened the UK government to authoritarian regimes around the
world, calling on former Prime Minister Theresa May to “stop giving Putin and Xi
Jinping ideas” (Don’t Spy on Us 2016). Yet, academic discussions have put less em-
phasis on democracy and the resources it can provide for critiques of digital surveil-
lance. For surveillance theorist David Lyon, liberal democracies are ultimately both
compatible with, and lead to, authoritarian surveillance (Lyon 2014, 11). In a col-
lective article dedicated to the effects of mass surveillance on human rights, democ-
racy, and subjectivity, the authors argue that the meanings of both security and
democracy are not only changing, but their relationship is becoming destabilized.
However, there is an assumption here that democracy is about the “the possibili-
ties of liberty or self-determination” (Bauman et al. 2014, 135). Another reason why
democracy has been less prominent in the discussions of digital or mass surveillance
is that public discourses have tended to emphasize “privacy” and “data protection”
rather than democratic principles and practices more broadly. This is also echoed
in the academic literature, which challenges the assumption that security needs to
be “balanced” against liberty or, more recently, privacy.
We propose a political sociology of disputes to advance an agenda that analyses
the contestation and critique of security practices. The terminology of a sociology
of disputes was coined by Luc Boltanski, mostly known in IR for his work with Lau-
rent Thévenot on pragmatic sociology (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), and with
Ève Chiapello on “the new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). Dis-
putes have been part of a wider vocabulary of social and political contestation which
includes controversies, scandals, and affairs. Among these, controversies and strug-
gles have been most fruitful for recent analyses of security beyond securitization
theory. Yet, disputes have often been used interchangeably with other vocabular-
ies of contestation (but see Martin-Mazé 2017). While controversies and disputes
are both coinages of pragmatic sociology, there are subtle, but in our view impor-
tant, differences between these. We argue that we need to attend to the specificity
of disputes and the constraints upon the different grammars of justification and
critique in Boltanski and Thévenot’s work, to precisely shed light on how some
arguments against bulk surveillance are rendered unacceptable, and thus “off-the-
table.” We approach these questions of acceptability through the dynamics of gener-
ality/singularity and the capacity of justifications and critique to “rise in generality”
(Boltanski 2012b). To understand how the general and the singular play out in
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anthropologist Arjun Appadurai’s (2006) critical reading of “small numbers” in lib-
eral democracies. Appadurai’s work on majority/minority allows us to advance a
political sociology of disputes.
Since 2014, a number of international and UK civil society organizations have
mobilized publicly and before the courts, leading to three key cases challenging
the practices of UK intelligence agencies on surveillance before the ECtHR. The
ECtHR has been a productive site for disputing digital surveillance both before
and after the Snowden disclosures. Three cases—10 Human Rights Organisations v
UK, Big Brother Watch v the UK, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice
Ross v UK—were filed in 2013 and 2014, in the wake of the Snowden disclosures
about mass surveillance. The three cases were brought together for the Chamber
judgment of September 2018. In the wake of the initial judgment, the cases were
referred to the Grand Chamber, where they were joined with a fourth case, Centrum
för rättvisa v Sweden. On May 25, 2021, the Grand Chamber issued its judgment.
All three cases challenged existing UK legislation on the acquisition, intercep-
tion, and retention of communications under Article 8 and Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights. They brought together a heterogeneous range
of digital rights and civil liberties actors from across the world, both in the appli-
cations and through interventions in the case (third-party submissions). Many of
these actors were also equally involved in public debates and campaigns against dig-
ital surveillance, such as the “Don’t Spy on Us” coalition. We focus on the parties’
submissions since 2013, oral hearings, as well as extensive third-party submissions by
a range of actors situated both within Member states of the Council of Europe and
beyond. We supplement this textual and oral material with justifications gleaned
from interviews with several of the actors involved in these disputes, both before
the Court and publicly.1
Through empirical analysis of these disputes, we reconsider how the relations
between security and democracy are enacted through the justifications and critiques
of various actors. We argue that justifications of surveillance for security lay claim
to the “general,” whereas critiques of digital surveillance that mobilize democratic
claims have difficulty rising in generality and remain singular.
To develop this argument, we proceed in three stages. We start with a brief discus-
sion of the different ways in which the relation between security and democracy has
been addressed in IR. We locate three discursive and analytical modes: limits, sym-
biosis, and controversies. In a second step, we introduce the sociology of disputes,
and focus on the political aspects of the treatment of democracy. Third, we analyze
how the relations between democracy and security are articulated through different
dynamics of the rise in generality/descent into singularity in the disputes between
the UK government, courts, and civil society actors.
Security and Democracy: Limits, Symbiosis, Controversies
The relation between security and democratic practices has preoccupied critical
social sciences and IR for some time. While it is impossible to discuss this scholarship
exhaustively here, we can distil three main ways in which these tensions have been
tackled by different authors. These approaches are not fully separate, there are also
combinations, entanglements, or transitions between them.
A first approach can be understood as that of “limits.” Both security and democ-
racy are constituted by particular “logics” that are mutually limiting. In securitiza-
tion theory, security practices appear as an expression of a “limit,” be it the limit
of democracy, of politics, of norms, and normality. As Jef Huysmans succinctly ren-
1
While many of our interviewees have agreed to be named, others have not. Therefore, to avoid inadvertently
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ders this approach, “exceptionalist securitising also defines what counts as normal
or democratic in the very act of identifying what is considered abnormal or non-
democratic” (Huysmans 2014, 78). Andrew Neal (2019, 1) locates, and subsequently
challenges, the view that security is “anti-politics.” Security is not just about draw-
ing the lines and constituting normality and abnormality, exceptional and ordinary
practices, but about the limits of (democratic) politics. In poststructuralist work
on security, limits are conceived differently, as “historically and culturally diverse
ways of enacting distinctions, discriminations and classifications” (Walker 2015, 15).
For instance, Walker (2015, 282–3) problematizes the relationship between security
and democracy in terms of limits, but conceives security both as a spatiotemporal
and social “condition of possibility and limit.” He draws out this discussion on the
politics of security and democracy by contrasting different understandings of the
demos/polis.
A sociological reading of “limits” does not start from differing logics, but it sees
these as relational and emergent logics of practice. Thus, logics of security emerge
through the definitional struggles over (in)securitization by various security profes-
sionals and experts (Balzacq et al. 2010). Therefore, there are different logics of
(in)securitization by the military, police, border guards, or risk management fields
(Bigo 2014). Critical scholars addressing the political effects of the “war on terror”
mapped these transformations of security logics across various fields and arenas of
practice. For instance, in analyses of risk-based technologies and bulk data collec-
tion access by (in)security professionals, security practices have encroached upon
ever increasing spheres of social life (Amoore and de Goede 2008; Aradau and
Blanke 2015). As suspicion becomes the principal way through which people relate
to each other, it also challenges the logics of democracy. Bigo, Guild, and Walker
(2016, 9) have traced such shifting of limits and argued that “we confront a signifi-
cant integration of systems of security across both functional sectors and territorial
spaces and a systematic privileging of integration in security apparatuses.” This, they
continue, “is in sharp contrast to the heterogeneous practices of democracy, rights,
and liberty, all of which seem to be fragmented or fragmenting” (Bigo et al. 2016,
9). Critique entails making visible these competing logics of security and democracy,
and challenging them from different fields of practice.
A second approach can be seen as that of “symbiosis” between security and
democracy. Rather than antithetical, security and democracy—particularly liberal
democracy—are symbiotic, inextricably entwined, sharing one overarching logic.
Inspired by a Marxist approach, Mark Neocleous has rejected the discourse of “bal-
ance” between security and liberty as a “liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks
the fact that liberalism’s key category is not liberty, but security” (Neocleous 2007,
131). Given that liberalism inscribes prerogative, discretion and decision beyond
the law into its techniques of governance, it renders security as paramount. In
these approaches, liberal democracy is security and there is little that distinguishes
them. Other critical scholars have asked to diffuse the distinction between nor-
mal and exceptional, challenging assumptions that (liberal) politics can be non-
militarized or non-violent, as exemplified in Ali Howell’s coinage of “martial pol-
itics” (Howell 2018). Howell criticizes the concept of militarization—in ways that
extend to the concept of securitization—for presuming “peaceful liberal order that
is encroached on by military values or institutions” (Howell 2018, 117). In these crit-
ical approaches, democracy pertains to a broader “martial politics” of liberal orders.
Both security and democracy are martial, imperial, and colonial projects.
Here, too, sociological readings have attended to practices of gendering,
racialization, and othering in different spatio-temporal sites, and have traced
the continuities of security’s exclusionary logic historically. Rather than urgency,
exceptional decision and friend/enemy lines, logics of security and risk entail the
constitutive exclusion of racialized and gendered bodies (e.g., Gray and Franck
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symbiosis is read through the continuous legacy of origins or through practices of
(re)production, the latter also giving an account of resistance and opening to the
transformation of (democratic) politics. Both in and beyond IR, security practices
have been analyzed as reproducing colonial logics through policing and exclusion.
While democracy re-enacts this logic, for instance through the “prison industrial
complex” as a racializing and gendering apparatus, it is also the site of struggles
for freedom (Davis and Mendieta 2005). In excavating the deep intertwinement
between surveillance and anti-blackness, Simone Browne recasts surveillance stud-
ies in relation to the archive of transatlantic slavery and suggests different modes
of critique. Although she does not address democracy explicitly, she contrasts
racializing surveillance with “the possibilities for fugitive acts of escape, resistance,
and the productive disruptions that happen when blackness enters the frame”
(Browne 2015, 164). Browne’s critical reworking of surveillance studies leads to a
focus on subversion and struggle which speaks, in many respects, to our problem
of the “inescapability” of constraints faced by critics of surveillance and what makes
certain claims acceptable and heard.
Third, practice approaches have more recently mobilized pragmatist literature
to analyze the relation between security and democracy as more contingent and
messy. In this vein, Huysmans speaks of security as diffuse practices of “assembling
suspicion” (Huysmans 2014) and not just exceptionalist securitizing. Drawing pri-
marily on Actor Network Theory (ANT), a lively strand of scholarship in critical
security studies mobilizes the terminology of “socio-technical controversies” and
highlights the significance of material devices for the constitution of public de-
bates related to security problems. Controversies attend to the multiplicity of human
and non-human actants that do not inhabit a field or a social world (Latour 2005).
In this vein, analysis is oriented toward the material infrastructure and devices of po-
litical articulations and critiques. Building on what William Walters has called “the
theme of controversies,” critical scholars have mobilized controversies conceptually
and methodologically to understand how security is enacted and with what politi-
cal implications (e.g., Schouten 2014; Walters 2014; Hönke and Cuesta-Fernandez
2018).
Gros, de Goede, and İşleyen (2017) articulate this approach around the LIBE
committee’s hearings on the Snowden disclosures, as mediation itself becomes an
object of struggle; the materiality of the hearings themselves and the online archive
of documents and dossiers related to Snowden are imbued with explicit moral and
political capacities. Methodologically, they draw on Noortje Marres’ notion of “ma-
terial participation,” in which public participation is theorized as being entangled
with material objects, thus enabling the examination of platforms and forums in-
volved in the emergence of publics (Marres 2012). Indeed, for Snowden himself,
the power of “publicity” and an informed public was deemed crucial in holding
governments to account for bulk surveillance (Gros, de Goede, and İşleyen 2017).
This linking of publicity and democratic critique is central to the ANT-inspired lit-
erature, where the “normative force” of critique cannot be untangled from the ma-
terial composition of a public (Marres and Lezaun 2011, 503).
Politics here is conceived more in terms of the socio-material work of assembling
and reassembling, while democracy is understood in relation to publics and public-
ity as ways of contesting security practices (Walters 2014; Walters and D’Aoust 2015).
This modality of critique has also been advanced in relation to surveillance practices
which are diffuse, generating emergent publics which are multiple, dispersed and
outside of established institutional settings (Monsees 2019).
Though this work has made great strides in terms of analysis of the modes of
contesting security, there has been less attention to differences between pragmatic
approaches. Specifying the particular theoretical and methodological clout of ana-
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address by orienting our analysis of critiques of surveillance to a description of the
processes through which criticism is taken seriously by different actors (Gadinger
2016). This process of being taken seriously attends not only to the substance of
the critique and the capacity of actors to shift the frame of situations, but to the
constraints within which these are embedded and all the contextual relevance the
disputing process embodies (Chateauraynaud 2009). As Martin-Mazé (2017, 213)
has aptly put it in the context of disputes, “actors quarrel over the justification of
their actions . . . they dispute how to test reality, but not reality itself.” In short, our
analysis tends to the politics of acceptability of certain arguments.
Such politics of acceptability gets us closer to a more nuanced understanding of
the limits of democracy in contesting surveillance in the name of security. At the
same time, it also points to possibilities of thinking more practically about the ways
in which democratic principles can be mobilized precisely within the constraints
objectivized using the Boltanski-inspired analysis we propose. In the next section,
we introduce the sociology of disputes, and supplement it with a reading of the
relation between democracy and critique via Appadurai’s work on “fear of small
numbers.”
A Political Sociology of Disputes and the Grammars of Critique
Disputes, according to Boltanski, are situations in which different points of view
come into conflict. Alongside ANT, the sociology of disputes is another of the prag-
matic approaches that have emerged through varied critiques of Bourdieu’s sociol-
ogy. As disputes entail dynamics of critique and justification, Boltanski’s pragmatic
sociology has also been described as a “sociology of critique,” a “sociology of crit-
ical capacity” (Susen and Turner 2014). In its focus on disputing processes and
situations, it shares similarities with ANT and other practice-oriented approaches
to contestation (Gadinger 2016; Bueger and Gadinger 2018). IR scholars see it as
another analytical “tool . . . to study controversies as done by assemblage and actor-
network theorists” (Ochoa, Gadinger, and Yildiz, 2020, 4). While ANT has focused
on scientific controversies, Boltanski is thought to attend to conflictual situations
more generally (Guggenheim and Potthast 2012, 5).
Yet, disputes are subtly different from controversies, struggles, or conflicts, even
as these languages have been largely used interchangeably in IR. For Boltanski
and Thévenot (2006, 13), disputes are “limited neither to a direct expression of
interests nor to an anarchic and endless confrontation between heterogeneous
worldviews clashing in a dialogue of the deaf.” Disputes are subject to a series of
constraints that “govern the construction of a well-founded argument” (Boltanski
and Thévenot 2006, 140). It is the careful unpacking of constraints on “mak-
ing reality unacceptable” (Boltanski 2008) that distinguishes the sociology of dis-
putes from mapping controversies and other sociological analyses of contestation.
Over several decades, Boltanski, in collaboration with Thévenot, Chiapello, and
Claverie, has explored the various forms of critique, from denunciation to scan-
dals, and how different arguments are seen as acceptable or normal or not. These
constraints on rendering the reality of digital surveillance unacceptable are par-
ticularly important for us, given the difficulties that critics of digital surveillance
have faced.
How do certain critiques become accepted in disputes? How do certain justifi-
cations account for what is acceptable in the world? Boltanski has analyzed how
disputes become acceptable by attending to how different actors are able—or, con-
versely, unable—to generalize claims about injustice. In this paper, we want to draw
attention to a particular aspect of the sociology of disputes: the category of the
“general” and the practices of rising in generality—and the opposite practice of de-
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to the constraints that critique encounters beyond the moments of openness and
multiplicity when reality is put to the test.2
The relation between the “general” and the “singular” is central to disputes about
injustice, partly—we would argue—because it is central to grammars of democracy.
Whether in his analysis of justification of abortion, of justice, or of distant suffering,
the “rise in generality” (and its opposite, the “rise in singularity”) is key to disputes
and the justifications of different actors. We propose to attend to a specific aspect
of disputes about injustice, where a demand for recognizing claims as acceptable
or “normal” entails processes of generalizing—or what Boltanski has also called
“aggrandizing.”
Given the recurrence of the “rise in generality” across his work, it is surprising
that it has been largely overlooked in engagements with the sociology of disputes.
The category of the general first appears in the work on justification and critique
with Laurent Thévenot. Here, generality is both a constraint and a condition of
possibility for justifications and critiques to be taken seriously. There are six worlds
that Boltanski and Thévenot analyze as constraints upon justification: inspirational,
domestic, reputational, civic, commercial, and industrial. Each of these worlds has
different criteria of “worth” in common, so the rise in generality would be enacted
differently in each of these. In the civic world, which is most relevant for how pub-
lic debates about digital surveillance have been framed, the worth of people “cor-
responds to the generality of their state” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 121). As
Boltanski and Thévenot summarize it, the worthy beings of the civic world are “the
masses and the collectives that assemble and organise them” (Boltanski and Thévenot
2006, 186). The civic world relies on the simultaneous rejection of the particular
and the construction of generality through reference to collectives as majorities,
masses or the people. The rise in generality can be simply put as the more general
a claim, actor or statement, the higher the worth it acquires.
In Justice and Love as Competences, the rise in generality becomes central to disputes
over injustice. Here, Boltanski discusses a series of letters sent to the French newspa-
per Le Monde, which denounce different forms of injustice (Boltanski 2012b). He re-
constructs the judgments on the acceptability of the claims. It is not the claims them-
selves that are judged as “normal,” but the situations in which they are formulated
and how they represent the relation between the victim and the denouncer. Boltan-
ski sees the relation between the general and the particular as underpinning the
judgment of normality: “the constraints of normality that weigh on denunciation
must depend fundamentally on the way in which each political order constructs the
relation between the particular and the general, between private interests and the
common good” (Boltanski 2012b, 194). Generality is not immediately connected
with democracy, although Boltanski acknowledges that political denunciations of
injustice need to have a collective aspect, as he notes that “it is not normal, for ex-
ample, for the father of a family to write a political programme destined solely for
his children” or “for a private individual to use a letter to the editor to denounce be-
fore public opinion a son guilty of lacking respect for his parents” (Boltanski 2012b,
193–4).
While briefly noting that different social distributions of how the relation between
the general and the singular is rendered acceptable, Boltanski does not inquire into
why some of these dynamics appear normal and acceptable, whereas others do not.
If, for him, the rise in generality is a constraint on what is acceptable critique in
public disputes about injustice, it is also a desirable aspect of disputes. This is also
partly due to the wider democratic context of situations of dispute that Boltanski
has analyzed. Some commentators have argued that Boltanski’s pragmatic sociol-
ogy is a “critical political sociology of democracy,” which likens actors’ regimes of
2
Ochoa, Gadinger, and Yildiz (2020) focus their analysis of the Snowden disclosures on these moments of “uncer-
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justification to a “plurality of democratic repertoires” (Blokker and Brighenti 2011,
242).
This understanding of democracy as grounded in pluralist societies is partly sup-
ported by Boltanski’s own sparse reflections on democracy. The inaugural public
lecture for the Pétrarque Prize, awarded to Mysteries and Conspiracies, is one of the
few occasions where Boltanski addresses relations between critique and democracy
(Boltanski 2012a). While he sees critical sense as “one of the more general hu-
man capacities,” he highlights the relation between institutions and critique. Cri-
tique is central to democratic institutions, as without critique, institutions would
be all-powerful. “The cause of critique is the cause of democracy,” he concludes
(Boltanski 2012a). We would argue, however, that it is a rather minimalist concep-
tion of democracy which is understood only through the trope of “plurality.” Sepa-
rately, sociologist Kate Nash has argued for the need to supplement the six worlds
developed in the early work on justification with a grammar of human rights, while
simultaneously highlighting the lack of specification of the political order in which
everyday claims against injustice are formulated. She adds her voice to a range of
critics who have pointed out that Boltanski’s analyses of disputes, critique, and jus-
tification “can be valid only in a constitutional democracy, in which, by definition,
there is respect for pluralism” (Nash 2014, 358). Yet, even as democracy does not
acquire the status of a “world,” democratic claims to rights also enact generality
and singularity. However, there is a further dimension to the rise in generality in
(liberal) democracies.
In his reflections on the “fear of small numbers,” Appadurai has problematized
the relation between majorities and minorities in liberal democracies in terms that
help shed light on the potential injustice of the “rise in generality” (Appadurai
2006). He argues that minorities and majorities are “recent political inventions,”
which rely on technologies of counting, statistics, and the modern nation-state
(Appadurai 2006, 49–50). As he puts it, “Majorities need minorities in order to
exist” (Appadurai 2006, 50). Alongside individual/collective, majority/minority is
another of the forms through which the general and the singular are problematized
in democracies. For Appadurai, majorities become dangerous when they turn into
“predatory identities” which see themselves as a threatened majority and exhibit an
“anxiety of incompleteness about their sovereignty” (Appadurai 2006, 52). Rather than
the “tyranny of the majority,” which has preoccupied theorists of democracy, Ap-
padurai is concerned with the limitations of liberal democratic thought in address-
ing the relation between minority and majority. Although democracy often uses
the language of the people, the public or popular sovereignty, in practice democ-
racies work with these tensions between majorities/minorities. “Small numbers,”
Appadurai reminds us, “represent a tiny obstacle between majority and totality or
total purity” (Appadurai 2006, 53).
Minorities are part of liberal democratic processes, as the idea of a minority is
“a procedural one, having to do with dissenting opinions in deliberative or leg-
islative contexts in a democratic framework” (Appadurai 2006, 63). Thus, for him,
minorities in liberal democratic thought have everything to do with “dissent” and
little to do with “difference.” It is in that sense that liberal democratic thought is
unable to understand and engage with the potentiality of violence that undergirds
the relation between minorities and majorities. Liberal thought is limited to under-
standing minorities as “procedural” rather than cultural or ethnic, and therefore
as “temporary minorities, minorities solely by and for opinion” (Appadurai 2006,
63). Appadurai, however, is interested in social and cultural minorities, which have
become permanent and thus cannot be just temporary or procedural. With the
rise of human rights and claims to the protection of cultural and social minorities,
we have seen an increased ambivalence as to the relation between temporary and
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claims about minority dissent or difference come to be taken seriously when they
do not or cannot enact a “rise in generality”?
While Appadurai rightly acknowledges the tensions between minorities of dissent
and of difference, he does not offer an analysis of how these categories are contested
or how they play out in justifications and critiques of social and political practices.
Yet, his analysis helps nuance the more celebratory approach that Boltanski takes
to the “rise in generality.” Indeed, the “rise in generality” can harbor injustices and
erasures of singularity/minority. Moreover, it can obscure how critiques can become
acceptable through what sociologist Nathalie Heinich (2019) has termed a “rise in
singularity,” as in the example of a petition which can gain acceptability not just by
being signed by large numbers of people, but also if signed by a small number of
“notable” names.
We propose to unpack how disputes about surveillance enact a rise in general-
ity/descent into singularity. While security does not always require justification, we
have seen an increased presence of public contestation and dispute around security
practices.3 Digital surveillance by intelligence agencies has become a matter of pub-
lic contestation, with numerous actors, forms of evidence, and materials mobilized
on the various sites. For us, a political sociology of disputes can capture some of
the ways in which the relations between security and democracy are configured in
concrete situations. In the following section we propose to approach the relation
between security and democracy through an empirical analysis of how disputes over
digital surveillance by intelligence agencies work through different modes of rising
in generality or descending into singularity.
Disputing Digital Surveillance: Generalizing Security, Singularizing Democracy
How do the different actors involved in the ECtHR cases enact the “rise in general-
ity”? The disputes before the Court are inevitably subject to constraints—they draw
on legal principles and cannot invoke other questions of justice, which would be
deemed to be ultra vires, as one of our interlocutors notes (Interview, March 24,
2020). Yet, these disputes have unfolded publicly through the campaign “Don’t Spy
on Us” and activist mobilization. Arguing against the permissibility of the UK’s newly
termed “bulk powers” was not in fact entirely possible in the context of litigation,
even as that had been the position of many of the NGOs and digital rights activists
in the wake of the Snowden disclosures (Interview, March 3, 2020). As privacy and
freedom of expression are qualified rights, NGOs were obliged from the outset to
frame their critiques, by and large, in terms of establishing safeguards and legal
mechanisms of necessity and proportionality. There is no implication that there
can be no interference through surveillance and “the devil was [therefore] in the
detail” (Interview, January 9, 2020). We propose to unpack the dynamics of disputes
through the “rise in generality,” as it frames the tensions between the security prac-
tices of intelligence agencies (intensified by digital technologies) and democratic
rights.4
We start from the applicants’ critiques of indiscriminate or mass surveillance,
the reconfiguring of suspicion, and the problems of opacity and secrecy as points
of departure and then turn to the justifications of surveillance by the intelligence
3
Critical security studies have formulated different positions on the existence of controversies and disputes in
security practices. Andrew Neal sees them as particular recent developments in the “politicisation of security” (Neal
2019). Conversely, Marieke de Goede has argued that security is more contested than other fields of practice, with
policies “controversy-driven” and knowledge claims “continually contested” (de Goede 2018, 41).
4
Within the ECHR, an exception to the right of privacy is permitted such that it is in accordance with the law and
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
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agencies to each of these objections. We argue that the UK government simultane-
ously performs a “rise in generality” of security and a “rise in singularity” of the
effects of digital surveillance on democratic rights. Which justifications and cri-
tiques gain acceptance and which ones manage to “make reality unacceptable”?
We explore the difficulties that civil society organizations and rights activities have
in enacting a “rise in generality.” Drawing on Appadurai’s work, we also attend to
the limits of the “rise in generality.” We conclude with implications of this analy-
sis for the security/democracy dynamics and the democratic potential of a “rise in
singularity.”
Arbitrariness and Discretion: Generalizing through Large Numbers, Singularizing through Small
Numbers
For digital rights activists, surveillance can be seen as generalized in the sense
that, in a digital world, everyone has become a source of data and object of
surveillance. Yet, both the language of “mass surveillance” used by scholars and
campaigners, and the implication that surveillance is indiscriminate and therefore
generalized as it encompasses the majority of the population, have been rejected by
intelligence agencies. Rather than justifying exceptionalism and executive power,
intelligence agencies reject both the criticism of arbitrary or unfettered power, and
that of mass surveillance. Rather than an unfettered power, they argue that their
work should not be “fettered” further, as it would undermine their capacity to de-
fend the “general community” (Big Brother Watch and Others v the UK 2018 here-
inafter BBW 2018). Arguing strongly against the applicants’ assertion that the UK
government’s line is simply to “trust us” (Jaffey in ECtHR 2019), the government
in fact stresses the veracity and independence of their oversight and safeguarding
mechanisms (Eadie in ECtHR 2019).
How is the rise in generality enacted? The UK government rejects the terminol-
ogy of “mass surveillance” in an attempt to reduce the generality of rights infringe-
ments. It “denied that the section 8 (4) regime [of RIPA] permitted mass surveil-
lance of generalised access to communications” (BBW 2018, §284 emphasis ours).
While NGOs use the language of “unfettered” and “arbitrary” to characterize the
practices of intelligence agencies, the UK government renders these practices as
“fettered” and “limited.” The government not only denies the generality and arbi-
trariness of surveillance, but it also mounts a different justification, which draws on
the distinction between large numbers/small numbers, majority/minority.
As the ECtHR puts it, for an interference with an individual’s rights to be jus-
tifiable, it requires “balancing the extent of the interference with an individual’s
rights and freedoms against a specific benefit to the investigation or operation be-
ing undertaken by a relevant public authority in the public interest” (BBW 2018,
§117). A judgment of proportionality is underpinned by a calculation of generality
and singularity. According to the Court, surveillance entails an evaluation of the im-
pact on rights to avoid that the “adverse impact on the rights of another individual
or group of individuals is too severe” (BBW 2018, §117). Thus, the large numbers
of communities or publics need to be justified in relation to the small numbers
of those who might be impacted by surveillance. The critique of disproportionate
surveillance as generalized is recast through the balance of proportionate action,
which limits infringements of rights while generalizing security. The government
highlights the limitations of surveillance through small technical details: The num-
ber of surveilled people is de-generalized through spatio-temporal selection, the
filtering and discarding of data, so that the government can argue that only a mi-
nority effectively become targets of surveillance. In the case of the interception of
Amnesty emails by GCHQ, for example, the IPT found that the interception was
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NGOs and rights groups critiquing surveillance have responded to these justi-
fications and have rearticulated their critiques in terms of large numbers. In this
regard, they attempt to generalize in relation to the sheer quantity of data collected
through the bulk powers (a large quantity of data or “all communications data”)
and the populations affected (a substantial part of European populations). One
submitter, in making this claim, points to another case, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary,
whereby the Court had previously accepted that a law permitting surveillance on
a wide range of persons might be “interpreted as paving the way for the unlim-
ited surveillance of a large number of citizens” (Open Society Justice Foundation
2016, §25). NGOs are thus able to link the idea of mass surveillance with the vol-
ume of data and numbers of people surveilled. The rise in generality in this case
works through large numbers, as we saw in Appadurai’s argument. When intelli-
gence agencies attempt to minimize the effect of “bulk” by emphasizing selection
of bearers, NGOs try to generalize by drawing attention to the fact that “selection”
can still mean millions of innocent people (Big Brother Watch et al. 2019, §58d).
In their third-party submission to the ECtHR in the case of 10 Human Rights Or-
ganisations v UK, the NGO Article 19 works through different modes of generaliza-
tion and singularization. First, they aim to extend the critique beyond the singulariz-
ing focus on “the protection of private life” according to the European Convention
on Human Rights. They do so by invoking freedom of expression and the protec-
tion of NGOs as social and public “watchdogs.” Second, they aim at a further gen-
eralization through an invocation of individuals understood as the “general public”
(Article 19 2016, 4).
The UN Special Rapporteur for freedom of expression, in his intervention to the
Grand Chamber, rises further in generality, to link freedom of expression under
international law, a qualified right, with freedom of opinion, which allows for no
interference whatsoever (Kaye 2020, §9). This framing, which sees digital technolo-
gies reconfiguring the way that people hold opinions, away from an abstract notion
limited to what an individual holds in their mind, to opinions being more tangibly
stored, through browsing histories or email archives (Kaye 2020, §10). This rise in
generality challenges the expansion of “security” by channeling democracy through
a much wider placeholder than privacy, the right to family life or even freedom of
expression: freedom of thought and opinion. However, this justification takes up
only two paragraphs of an intervention which came very late in the case proceed-
ings, and the Grand Chamber. The Court indeed finds a breach of Article 10 on
freedom of expression, but one which is singularized for confidential journalistic
material and the lack of sufficient safeguards (Big Brother Watch and Others v the
UK 2021, §450–8).
Suspicion and Democracy: Generalizing through (Unknown) Threats, Singularizing through
Intrusiveness
In the Big Brother Watch case, the ECtHR dispensed with the requirements in an
earlier case, Roman Zakharov v Russia, to have reasonable suspicion against a tar-
geted individual. The Court stated that “bulk interception is by definition untar-
geted, and to require “reasonable suspicion” would render the operation of such a
scheme impossible” (BBW 2018, §316, 317). Before the BBW and others case, tar-
geting was widely understood as the critical condition for surveillance practices, to
protect against arbitrariness (Carrera and Guild 2014, 2). NGOs argue that mass
surveillance and the uses of bulk have eliminated the requirement of suspicion and
have effectively led to its generalization.
In response to these critiques, the government mobilizes the distinction between
bulk data and targeted surveillance. Bulk data are generalized, but they are ren-
dered as necessary through the framing of “unknown” threats. This is compounded
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threats could emerge anywhere and might materialize anytime in the future. Both
the ECtHR and other oversight actors in the United Kingdom reiterate the view
of the former Counter-Terrorism Legislation Reviewer, David Anderson, about the
necessity of bulk powers:
Bulk acquisition has been demonstrated to be crucial in a variety of fields, includ-
ing counter-terrorism, counter-espionage and counter-proliferation. The case stud-
ies provide examples in which bulk acquisition has contributed significantly to the
disruption of terrorist operations and, though that disruption, almost certainly the
saving of lives. (Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office 2019, 63)
In this framing, bulk powers have a specific function, which is precisely to discover
these unknown threats. There is simply no alternative to bulk powers in this regard
(Eadie in ECtHR 2019). This formulation of threat, with bulk powers framed as a
sort of generalized solution to a myriad of (sometimes yet to emerge) problems,
is equivalent to a “rise in generality” for security. This “rise” works through con-
necting disparate threats quickly and emphatically; online child abuse, bombings,
organized crime, fraud, and cyber-attacks are all listed in quick succession by Eadie,
to justify the necessity of the bulk powers. This is an “aggrandizing” move which pur-
ports to make the claim to generality of threat acceptable (Boltanski 2012b). At the
same time, surveillance is minimized, as it takes place not at the point of data collec-
tion, but with the selection of the data to be analyzed, involving the interception of
internet bearers (BBW 2018, §325).
As the previous section showed, the UK government and the intelligence agen-
cies justify digital surveillance through the “rise in generality” of security and the
“descent into singularity” of rights infringements. If surveillance only affects a mi-
nority of people, the generality of the NGOs’ critique is limited. They are only able
to speak of the “substantial segment of the European populations” (Big Brother
Watch et al. 2019, §21) affected by the bulk powers, and not the totality of a pop-
ulation who are protected against a panoply of threats, as with the government’s
justifications. NGOs, however, rearticulate their critique of generalized surveillance
by attempting a rise in generality of the effects of surveillance for democracy as a
whole.
In their Written Observations to the Grand Chamber, the applicants in the three
joint cases invoke the language of democracy used by the Court in a 1978 case, Klass
v Germany, and remind of the risk of security laws “undermining or even destroying
democracy on the ground of defending it” (BBW 2019, §6). The ECtHR has also
recognized that the bulk data interception regime poses a “risk that a system of
secret surveillance set up to protect national security may undermine or even de-
stroy democracy under the cloak of defending it” (BBW 2018, §308). In the 2019
oral hearing, this argument acquires a stronger formulation as that of a totalitarian
danger for democracies:
Some people might find comfort in a world in which our every transaction and move-
ment could be recorded. Crime fighting, security, safety, public health justifications
are never hard to find. The impact of such powers on the innocent could be mitigated
by the usual apparatus of safeguards, regulations and codes of practice. But a country
constructed on such a basis would surely be intolerable to many of its inhabitants. A
state that enjoyed all of these powers will be truly totalitarian, even if the authorities
had the best interests of the people at heart. (Jaffey in ECtHR 2019)
Generalized suspicion becomes a general threat to democracies, as potentially
experienced by the majority of people. Jaffey explicitly links this totalitarian
imaginary to the reconfiguration of suspicion, which has shifted from “targeting a
suspect who has been identified to treating everyone as a potential suspect whose
data must be stored, analysed and profiled” (Jaffey in ECtHR 2019). The NGOs
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formulation of generality expressed as “the cumulative effect of combining data
from many warrants and bearers, as well as the building of mass data repositories,
and the increasing automation—and therefore wide-scale interrogation—of those
databases” (BBW 2019, §17).
Yet, in doing so, they are also caught within a different tension raised by gen-
eralized surveillance. For instance, while highlighting the extent of surveillance,
they also argue about its singularizing effects of intrusiveness into the intimate de-
tails of private lives. For the NGOs, the bulk surveillance simultaneously translates
into more particularized surveillance. Thus, they argue that “technological develop-
ments mean that Governments could now create detailed and intrusive profiles of
intimate aspects of private lives by analysing patterns of communications on a bulk
basis” (BBW 2018, §280). The main example given about “grave risks” to democracy
from this more “intrusive” surveillance is the GCHQ bulk equipment interference
program, Optic Nerve, revealed by Snowden, to collect images of webcam users
every five minutes, many of which are, as stressed by Jaffey, of an intimate and sex-
ual nature. With the overturning of the requirement for suspicion in any process
of surveillance and the acceptability of bulk powers as necessary, the UK govern-
ment can quite easily appropriate this particularization of surveillance with the ar-
gument that any alternatives to bulk powers would in fact be “more intrusive” and
involve even greater infringements of privacy (Eadie in ECtHR 2019). Once suspi-
cion can be dispensed with as a requirement for surveillance, generalizing democ-
racy through a very particularized notion of rights infringements becomes more
ambivalent than the “rise in generality” of security that bulk powers present.
Yet, this “descent into singularity” is not inevitable, as an opposite justification by
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) indicates. In an earlier case,
the CJEU had “generalized” digital surveillance, arguing that bulk data collection
“taken as a whole, is liable to allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concern-
ing the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as everyday
habits, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the
activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social envi-
ronments frequented by them” (CJEU 2016, §98–9). Here the Court brought to-
gether generic surveillance with the law’s generalized interest in the rights of the
individual. In the ECtHR joint cases, even though the applicants similarly invoke a
mechanism of generalization through in-depth intrusion into private life, the Stras-
bourg court, unlike the CJEU, has not accepted the argument about intrusiveness.
Secrecy and Opacity: Generalizing through Publicity, Singularizing Transparency and the Right to
Redress
Before the Snowden disclosures, the ECtHR had a relatively clear position on
surveillance, as laws regulating surveillance needed to be “foreseeable” or “formu-
lated with sufficient precision so as to guarantee legal certainty” (Carrera and Guild
2014, 2). The NGOs’ objection that proportionality cannot be assessed due to se-
crecy relates to both the transparency of the mechanics of the law and the individ-
ual’s capacity for redress within this opaque set of practices. In democratic regimes,
the requirement of generality entails that rules are publicly known so that they can
be subject to debate and disagreement. Democratic rules are generalized through
the imaginary of a knowing public. The rules “had to be clear” and “the ambit of
rules had—in so far as possible—to be in the public domain” (BBW 2018, §32).
Relatedly, there must also exist the possibility for an individual to be made aware
that they have been the subject of surveillance, and to have the capacity for effec-
tive remedy if this surveillance is deemed “unlawful.” It is for this reason that a key
point put forward by NGOs for a series of limits on the intelligence agencies’ inves-
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judicial authorization, was the requirement for subsequent notification to be given
to the surveillance subject (BBW 2018, §281).
For NGOs and digital rights activists, the law fell short of the requirement of
generality as it was incomprehensible, complex, and opaque. Its effects of non-
knowledge (see Aradau 2017) appear antithetical to democratic commitments to
public knowledge and knowing publics. Mobilizing this notion of generality, the ap-
plicants to the ECtHR argue that “the law was so complex and inaccessible to the
public” that it lacked the generality of law (BBW 2019, §257). Secrecy and opac-
ity are invoked as de-generalizing and therefore render surveillance unacceptable.
Similarly, the right to effective remedy is completely futile if one does not know that
they have been the subject of surveillance (Jaffey in ECtHR 2019). The opacity of
the law becomes a key battering ram through which to challenge the use of bulk
powers (Interview, September 24, 2019). This attempt to reduce the generality of
the government’s key arguments opens a chink in the government’s justification
that its bulk powers are overseen by a “suite of safeguards” (Eadie in ECtHR 2019).
This fissure is effective, as it is presented solely in terms of proportionality, which,
as we previously discussed, always entails an element of generality. One interviewee
set out the position of their NGO in relation to the intelligence agencies in relation
to proportionality thus:
They [the agencies] are working for the public good. They’re doing amazing work
and I really respect the people who work for the security services. It’s just a matter of
making sure that their work doesn’t go too far in intruding on the other important
rights that we have as a society. (Interview, February 24, 2020)
Once again, we can see the tension between generalizing and singularizing
emerge. The NGOs’ attempt to rise in generality through publicity and publics is
undermined by their simultaneous acceptance of the generalization of security as a
“common good,” as shown in the interview above. Moreover, the recourse to trans-
parency sustains the justification of democratic accountability through “safeguards”
and “the liberal manifestation of democracy as an inherently accountable system”
(Birchall 2011, 63). Not only are NGOs excluded from the scrutinizing publics, but
their critique risks reinforcing the generalization of security and the agencies’ justi-
fication that they are defending the “general community.”
An interview with one of the applicants in the BBW case confirmed this idea of
transparency as a sort of “last resort”; a final attempt to be able to engage with
the government and the agencies, and to normalize the presence of civil society in
discussions around balancing different rights, without having to resort to strategic
litigation: “This [bulk surveillance] shouldn’t happen, but it is going to happen. So,
what we can do is try to make it more transparent and sensible” (Interview, March
24, 2020).
The risk of this strategy for NGOs is that transparency is much more particular-
ized by the UK government from the outset, as it becomes framed as the main means
for NGOs themselves to be involved in debates around safeguards. Moreover, their
work can be appropriated as instrumental, sensational, and driven by self-interest
in securing funding and attracting publicity (Interview, December 5, 2019). This
can also be seen with the NGOs’ argument around the futility of effective remedy
through the IPT if one does not know that they are the subject of surveillance. Here,
the UK government is easily able to rise in generality and to de-singularize the role
of the IPT by framing it as an effective remedy without the need for evidence of
surveillance, as claims can be made by any person who merely suspects they are the
subject of surveillance (Eadie in ECtHR 2019).
Nonetheless, NGOs were able to rise in generality and counter some of these jus-
tifications by drawing upon the same independent reports that the UK government
drew upon in their justifications. Anderson’s widely invoked report, A Question of
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bility” (Anderson 2017). The public dimension was also manifest in his reflections
on the need for oversight of intelligence agencies, which “should be public-facing,
transparent and accessible to the media” (Anderson 2017, 80).
If we read the justifications and the critiques of surveillance in these terms of
the rise in generality/descent into singularity, it appears that while there is a widely
accepted “rise in generality” of security, the most that democracy can hope for is a
“descent into singularity” of rights infringements. Through safeguards and technol-
ogy, only a minority of people need be affected, intrusion kept to the bare minimum
required. Not only does “generality of security” remain unscathed, but it expands
further, even reproduced by the NGOs whose arguments are caught within a gen-
eral/singular tension. “Escape” from these constraints, as our first interlocutor so
eloquently stated, is very difficult.
Conclusion: Democracy and the Rise in Singularity?
As the surveillance practices of intelligence agencies have become increasingly
known to publics, we have seen an extension rather than retrenchment of surveil-
lance and the power of security actors. We have proposed a political sociology of
disputes to revisit the relation between security and democracy and shed light on
these paradoxical developments. By taking disputes about digital surveillance as
the entry point to how the relation between security and democracy is enacted in
practice, we have shown that security actors justify surveillance through a “rise in
generality,” which civil society actors have much difficulty in replicating. Disputes
do not present an overarching narrative about the security–democracy relation but
can instead reveal the nuances of critique and justification in a particular situation.
By focusing on disputes around digital surveillance initiated by a coalition of
transnational and UK NGOs in the wake of the Snowden disclosures, we have
traced the rise in generality in justifications of surveillance and its critiques. Why
has it been so difficult to render the reality of surveillance unacceptable? We have
shown how justifications of surveillance rely on the “rise in generality” of security,
whereas critiques of surveillance struggle to enact a similar “rise in generality” for
democracy.
In this reading, singularity, and particularly the rise in singularity, would appear
to be a risk for democratic critiques of surveillance. However, Appadurai reminds us
that “small numbers” are not antagonistic to, but constitutive of, democratic prac-
tices. While the “rise in generality” has been difficult for NGOs, there has been
one instance where the “rise in singularity” has been successful, thus reminding us
of the need to reconsider the role of singularity—understood both as “small num-
bers” and as unique or different—for democracies. Surveillance of journalists and
journalists’ material set different limits to digital surveillance, as these communi-
cations are both a small number but deemed to be different from the majority of
communications. However, the singularity of the journalistic profession did not ex-
tend to other singular groups, particularly racialized minorities whose rights can be
most endangered by bulk surveillance.
Other disputes over digital surveillance, such as facial recognition, have high-
lighted this “rise in singularity” by highlighting the errors of technology toward
women and people of color, thus rendering their critiques increasingly acceptable
(Amnesty International 2021). The rise in singularity as an acceptable democratic
critique has, however, remained largely outside the critiques of digital surveillance
by intelligence agencies. As several of our interlocutors have remarked, this is partly
due to the limitations that law poses on disputes, but also because minority claims
are often seen as a challenge to the framework of universal rights, in which much of
European civil society operates. Despite the tensions that such a democratic gram-
mar could enact, not opposing the “rise in generality” and the “rise in singularity”
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A political sociology of disputes does not offer disputes as a replacement of strug-
gles or controversies as deployed in IR, but as a way to supplement our analytical
vocabularies and nuance our resources for critique. This also means that these con-
nections can be explored further, for instance by analyzing how the politics of ac-
ceptability could be connected to the politics of subversion or how the openness
of sociotechnical controversies differs from the dynamics of political disputes and
denunciation.
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